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IMPROVING JUSTICE AND AVOIDING COLONIZATION
IN MANAGING CLIMATE CHANGE RELATED DISASTERS:
A CASE STUDY OF ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES
E. Barrett Ristroph*
I. INTRODUCTION
From severe weather to flooding and rising sea levels, climate
change has begun to affect the well-being of communities across
America.1 There has been an increase in climate change-related
disasters, including disasters associated with coastal flooding and
erosion as well as those related to increasingly severe storms.2
American communities have increasingly called on their state and
national government for help in the face of severe storms and
flooding disasters.3 Small, impoverished, and indigenous

*

Ristroph is a lawyer, planner, mediator, and researcher living in Fairbanks,
Alaska, USA. She is the owner of Ristroph Law, Planning, and Research, which
provides services at a reasonable cost to tribes, communities, and agencies
related to natural resources, hazard mitigation, government, and climate change
adaptation. She also serves as counsel to Gazewood and Weiner, P.C., and as a
mediator for the Alaska Superior Court in Fairbanks. She completed a Ph.D. at
the University of Hawaii-Manoa in 2018 on how Alaska Native Villages are
adapting to climate change and how laws and planning help or hinder.
Originally from Cajun Country, Louisiana, USA, she has gained perspective
from living and working in the Northern Mariana Islands, the Philippines,
Hawaii, Arctic Alaska and Russia. Through her work, she hopes to build
bridges between communities in South Louisiana, Alaska, and the Pacific
Islands that are struggling with climate change and the need for sustainable
development.
1
John Walsh et al., Our Changing Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 19, (Jerry M.
Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, & Gary W. Yohe, eds., 2014).
2
Suwan Shen & E. Barrett Ristroph, Are Climate-Vulnerable Communities
Getting More Disaster Declarations? A Case Study of Flood-Prone Indigenous
Communities in Alaska, NAT. HAZARDS REV. (forthcoming) (2019); Jennifer
Leaning & Debarati Guha-Sapir, Natural Disasters, Armed Conflict, and Public
Health, 369 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1836 (Nov. 2013).
3
A. Cavallo, Disaster Cost Index, ALASKA DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, (Jan. 20, 2015); R. Steven Daniels, The Rise
of Politics and the Decline of Vulnerability as Criteria in Disaster Decisions of
the United States, 1953-2009, 37 DISASTERS 669 (2013); FEMA, Disaster
Declarations Summary - Open Government Dataset,
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/28318
[https://perma.cc/CV76-YG3D] (last visited Dec. 5, 2018); Bruce R. Lindsay,
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communities are among the populations that may be particularly
vulnerable to climate change and climate-related disasters because
they may require additional assistance.4
Principles of climate justice suggest that those who are the most
responsible for climate change should assist non-contributing, atrisk populations in adapting to climate change and responding to
disasters.5 While there are strong arguments for providing
impoverished indigenous communities with climate change
adaptation and disaster assistance, there is a danger that aid can have
the effect of further “colonizing” these communities by reducing
their ability to make decisions about their own fates6 and increasing
their dependence on government resources.7 Providing assistance
with disasters and climate change adaptation while ignoring the
legacy of colonialism may also perpetuate colonialism through
Western interventions that do not serve the long-term needs of
indigenous communities.8 Consistent with the procedural aspects of
climate justice principles, assistance needs to take place in a manner

FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues, Congressional
Research Service (May 7, 2014); Francis X. McCarthy, FEMA’s Disaster
Declaration Process: A Primer, Congressional Research Service, 13-14 (Nov.
12, 2014); Andrew Reeves, Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral
Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations, 73 THE JOURNAL OF
POLITICS 1142, 1144 (2011).
4
W. Neil Adger & Jon Barnett, Four Reasons for Concern about Adaptation to
Climate Change, 41 ENVT. & PLANNING A 2800 (2009); T.B. Bull Bennett et al.,
Indigenous Peoples, Lands, and Resources, in Melillo, et al., supra note 1, at
297; Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner and Randall S. Abate, International and
Domestic Law Dimensions of Climate Justice for Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 43
OTTAWA LAW REV. 113 (2013).
5
D. R. Nelson et al., Adaptation to Environmental Change: Contributions of a
Resilience Framework, 32 ANNU. REV. ENVIRON. RESOUR. 395, 410 (2007).
6
Emilie S. Cameron, Securing Indigenous Politics: A Critique of the
Vulnerability and Adaptation Approach to the Human Dimensions of Climate
Change in the Canadian Arctic, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 103, 104 (2012);
Elizabeth Marino, The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing
Vulnerability Construction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in
Shishmaref, Alaska, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 374, 380 (2012); DANIEL R.
WILDCAT, RED ALERT!: SAVING THE PLANET WITH INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE, at
39 (2009).
7
Shannon Michele McNeeley, Seasons out of Balance: Climate Change
Impacts, Vulnerability, and Sustainable Adaptation in Interior Alaska, 37
(2009); Henry Huntington et al., The Changing Arctic: Indigenous Perspectives,
in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT - SCIENTIFIC REPORT 91, 62 (2005);
Henry P. Huntington et al., Demographic and Environmental Conditions Are
Uncoupled in the Social-Ecological System of the Pribilof Islands, 28 POLAR
RESEARCH 119, 125 (2009).
8
Cameron, supra note 6, at 112.
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that avoids interfering with indigenous sovereignty and promotes
indigenous community participation.9
The purpose of this article is to outline national and Alaskan
legal frameworks for disaster assistance; to show how these
frameworks are reactive rather than proactive; and to illustrate how
they can be problematic when utilized for communities that are not
familiar with them and might not be adequately prepared to make
post-disaster decisions. I focus on Alaska Native Villages (ANVs),
which are federally recognized tribes and sovereign nations that are
located within the State of Alaska and are subject to federal
regulation. These indigenous communities, which comprise 41% of
the United States’ federally recognized tribes,10 are typically small,
impoverished, and remote, and they tend to value traditional
lifeways based on subsistence hunting and fishing.11 I conclude that
ANVs are not always able to get the help they need through these
frameworks, which has led to climate injustice.	
  
ANVs are a critical case study for two reasons. First, compared
to the rest of the country, climate change is happening far more
rapidly in Arctic Alaska (where many ANVs are located).12 Arctic
and sub-Arctic Alaska are the only places in the United States
dealing with the problem of melting permafrost.13 ANVs are
grappling with changes that have resulted in flooding and erosion,
the decline of species on which they subsist, melting permafrost, and
the delayed formation of the land-fast ice that used to serve as a
protective barrier from destructive fall storms.14

9

Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner & Randall S. Abate, International and Domestic
Law Dimensions of Climate Justice for Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 43 Ottawa L.
Rev. 113, 127 (2013); Jouni Paavola & W. Neil Adger, Fair Adaptation to
Climate Change, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 594, 596 (2006); Sophie
Theriault, Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change Policies: A Comparative
Assessment of Indigenous Governance Models in Canada, Ch. 9 in LOCAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER
LOCALITIES (Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., 2012).
10
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ENTITIES RECOGNIZED AND ELIGIBLE TO
RECEIVE SERVICES FROM THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 82
FED. REG. 4915 (2017).
11
E. Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ J
ENVTL POL 47, 49 (2010).
12
F. Stuart Chapin III et al., Alaska, 514, in Melillo, et al., supra note 1.
13
Id.
14
Id., C.B. Field et al. Summary for Policy Makers, pp. 1-34 in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
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Second, climate change and disasters add to challenges
already faced by ANVs related to their economic situation and
colonization. The federal government arguably contributed to
ANVs’ climate vulnerability by requiring some ANVs to
permanently settle in flood-prone locations not meant for year-round
settlement.15 Some Alaska Natives and commentators perceive
ongoing colonization in terms of the imposition of state and federal
laws and social and economic practices that conflict with traditional
practices and values of ANVs.16 These laws and practices have
reduced the self-sufficiency of ANVs and limited their control over
resources that could aid adaptation and resilience.17 ANVs typically
lack the resources, workforce, and jurisdiction to undertake largescale climate change adaptation and disaster response actions on
their own.18 While ANVs retain sovereignty over their members,19

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (C.B. FIELD ET AL, EDS.
2014); Ristroph, supra note 11, at 51-58.
15
Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 5 (2013),
www.Brookings.Edu/Research/Papers/2013/01/30-Arctic-Alaska-Bronen
[https://perma.cc/93S9-ZMRE]; Jessica Scott, Move or Wait for the Flood and
Die: Protection of Environmentally Displaced Populations through a New
Relocation Law, 9 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 369, 381 (2014); Robert J. Martin, The
Village of Kivalina Is Falling into the Sea: Should CERCLA Section 9626 (B) Be
Available to Move the Village from Harm’s Way, 2 EARTH JURISPRUDENCE &
ENVTL. JUST. J. 1 (2012).
16
INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMMISSION, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE
AMERICA SAFER - REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, May 2015, 47, available at
https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_A
merica_Safer-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RTL-UUVT]; Harold Napoleon,
Alaska Natives: Still a People in Peril, ALASKA DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 2014,
available at http://www.adn.com/article/20141018/alaska-natives-still-peopleperil [https://perma.cc/2F9F-RVNM]; Lisa Wexler, Looking across Three
Generations of Alaska Natives to Explore How Culture Fosters Indigenous
Resilience, 51 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 73, 80 (2014); THOMAS BERGER,
A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES, NATIVE RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS SINCE 1492, at 130 (2d ed. 1999); Marino, supra note 6, at 375, 378.
17
Philip A. Loring et al. , “Community Work” in a Climate of Adaptation:
Responding to Change in Rural Alaska, 44 HUMAN ECOLOGY 119, 122 (2016);
Amanda H. Lynch & Ronald D. Brunner, Context and Climate Change: An
Integrated Assessment for Barrow, Alaska, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 93, 97 (2007);
Huntington (2005), supra note 7, at 91.
18
E.B. Ristroph, Improving the Quality of Alaska Native Village Climate
Change Planning, 11 J GEOG. & REGIONAL PLANNING 143 (2018).
19
See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (h)(1) (“each Indian tribe shall retain inherent sovereign
power to adopt governing documents under procedures other than those
specified in this section”); Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107
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United States law has deprived them of jurisdiction over their
traditional lands and natural resources.20 ANVs lack their own tax
base 21 and often rely on external funding and consultants.22
This article is based on dissertation research aiming to
understand how ANVs are adapting to climate change and
responding to disasters and how laws and planning processes help
or hinder their efforts. My research involved multiple approaches,
each of which I cover in more detail in a separate article.23 The first
approach was to review studies on adaptations to climate change,
studies on Alaska Natives, and commentaries on relevant laws. The
second approach was to review those relevant laws themselves.
The third approach involved 153 interviews and interviewlike conversations24 with ANV residents and people outside of those
communities who make or influence laws that affect them. I
specifically sought participants from ANVs for whom national
disaster declarations were made due to flooding within recent
decades. Of the fifty-nine ANVs from which my participants were
drawn, forty-two had been included in a state disaster declaration

Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2010) (“Indian tribes
possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of government,
including tribal justice systems.”); Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193
U.S. 127 (1904) (“A tribe may determine who are to be considered members by
written law, custom, intertribal agreement, or treaty with the United States.”);
Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1979) (inherent power to
determine membership does not depend on having a territorial base, so even
tribes with no Indian country may retain this power); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d
738 (Alaska 1999) (holding that ANCSA did not extinguish tribal sovereignty);
Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 473a)
(amending the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to include Alaska Natives).
20
See 43 U.S.C. § 1603.
21
Alaska Division of Community and Regional Affairs, Community Database
Online, DIVISION OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS,
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/dcra/DCRAExternal (last visited Dec. 5,
2018)[ https://perma.cc/KEY7-MRQ6].
22
Richard J. T. Klein et al., Adaptation Opportunities, Constraints, and Limits,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY
WORKING GROUP II CONTRIBUTION TO THE IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT,
GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 907 (2014).
23
E.B. Ristroph, Presenting a Picture of Alaska Native Village Adaptation: A
Method of Analysis, 5 SOCIOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY 762 (2017).
24
This were conversations where participants essentially answered the interview
questions but did not want to be formally interviewed. Interviews and
conversations took place between June 2016 and March 2016 in person in ANVs
and at conferences pertaining to ANVs, or by phone calls from Fairbanks to
participants’ locations.
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pertaining to a climate-related disaster during the study period, and
thirty-six had been part of a national disaster declaration. Eighteen
participants from ANVs that were the subjects of disaster
declarations described the underlying events when interviewed.
The fourth approach was to analyze community plans
relevant to the fifty-nine ANVs from which I selected participants,
including hazard mitigation plans required by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for certain kinds of
disaster assistance to be granted25 and plans related to economic
development and land use. I used qualitative content analysis26 to
identify major adaptation actions, relevant laws and agencies,
facilitators, barriers, recommendations for change, and other themes
emphasized in interviews, related conversations, and community
plans.
The fifth approach involved a review of the State of Alaska’s
record of state-issued disaster declarations related to flooding and
erosion from the initiation of state declarations under the Alaska
Disaster Act (June 10, 1977) through the end of 2014. 27 The record
indicates the nature of the disasters to which some of the
declarations pertain, the communities or areas that were included in
each disaster declaration, and indications as to which of these state
declarations resulted in the issuance of a federal disaster declaration.
I also reviewed FEMA’s record of the federal disaster declarations
that are noted in the state record. 28 There are far fewer federal
declarations since these require a higher threshold than state
declarations. FEMA’s record indicated the underlying disaster for
each declaration, the type of assistance issued, and the county or
borough for which the declaration was issued.
This research was authorized by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Hawaii, and ethical considerations

25

42 U.S.C. § 5165(a).
MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA
ANALYSIS: AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK 56 (2d ed. 1994); JULIET CORBIN &
ANSELM STRAUSS, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND
PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY (3d ed. 2007).
27
Cavallo, supra note 3.
28
FEMA, FEMA Disaster Declarations Summary - Open Government Dataset,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/28318 [https://perma.cc/W7HA-P7DD) (last visited
Jan. 27, 2017].
26
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required keeping confidential the identity of research participants.
For this reason, the names of participants and ANVs are generally
not mentioned in this article.29
	
  

II. FRAMEWORK TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO DISASTERS
I begin with a description of how an ANV can seek disaster
assistance under the United States’ and Alaska’s laws.
Understanding the legal system for disaster response is important
because state and national assistance often come only after a disaster
is officially declared at the federal level.30 This section describes
the declaration system and discusses the literature that critiques it.
A. How Disaster Declarations Work
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)31 lays the groundwork for disaster
relief and planning for natural disasters. It establishes the process
for a Presidential (national) Disaster Declaration, which is required
for many types of national disaster funding.32

29

The differences in the questions answered by different participants (despite
starting with two questionnaires—one for each set of participants) limited the
ability to quantitatively compare responses between different participants. Given
this limitation and the subjectivity of my coding, I decided that using inferential
statistics was not appropriate. See H. RUSSELL BERNARD & GERY W. RYAN,
ANALYZING QUALITATIVE DATA: SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES (1st ed. 2009); Yan
Zhang & Barbara M. Wildemuth, Qualitative Analysis of Content, 1 ANALYSIS 1
(2005). I thus avoid referring to specific numbers of participants in this article.
To give an order of magnitude of the responses I got, I refer to “a few” (about 2
to 5), “several” (about 6 to 10), “a number of” (10-30), or “many” (more than
30). These categorizations are not statistically significant and should not be
interpreted in that manner.
30
Victor B. Flatt, Domestic Disaster Preparedness and Response, in THE LAW
OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE  : U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS,
481-509 (Michael Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh ed., 2012); Robin Bronen,
Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance
Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
357, 401 (2011); U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), ALASKA
NATIVE VILLAGES, LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING
VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION GAO-09-551, 43 (2009).
31
Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-5206, as amended by § 322 of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L.
106-‐ 390), Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-295, 120 Stat. 1394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
32
42 U.S.C. §§ 5122(1), 5191.
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Before a presidential disaster can be declared, there must be
a state or tribal disaster declaration.33 Alaska’s Disaster Act allows
the state governor to declare a “disaster emergency” if a natural
catastrophe or the outbreak of a disease causes or threatens to cause
severe damage or loss of life.34 A disaster must meet a certain
threshold (which is dependent on the local community’s resources)
to garner a state declaration.35 While ANVs, as federally recognized
tribes, could directly ask the president for a disaster declaration
without going through the State of Alaska, this process involves
cost-sharing requirements that the entity seeking a presidential
declaration must bear. ANVs and other federally recognized tribes
located in remote areas are often severely economically
disadvantaged and not in a position to assume these costs.36
Once a state or tribal disaster declaration has been made,
FEMA advises the President whether to declare a disaster.37 In
deciding what to recommend to the President, FEMA considers
whether the disaster is beyond the capabilities of the affected state
and local governments, such that federal assistance is necessary.38
While there are criteria for how much funding a disaster merits,
there are no clear criteria for whether a disaster is beyond the
capacity of state and local governments.39
Disasters addressed by the Stafford Act include hurricanes,
tornados, storms, floods, tidal waves, tsunamis, earthquakes,

33

42 U.S.C. § 5170(b).
Alaska Stat. §§ 26.23.020, 26.23.900(2).
35
Alaska Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, Public
Assistance Overview (2010), https://ready.alaska.gov/recovery/PublicAssistance
(https://perma.cc/48SZ-LQ4D).
36
Rachelle E. Luft, Governing Disaster: The Politics of Tribal Sovereignty in
the Context of (Un)natural Disaster, 39 ETHN. RACIAL STUD. 802, 808 (2016).
37
44 C.F.R. § 206.37(c). Since the recommendations to the president are a
matter of executive privilege and not accessible for analysis, researchers have
little insight into how this process actually works. John T. Gasper, The Politics
of Denying Aid: An Analysis of Disaster Declaration Turndowns, 22 J PUB.
MGMT. & SOC. POL’Y 7 (2015).
38
42 U.S.C. § 5170(a).
39
Mary W. Downton & R.A. Pielke Jr., Discretion Without Accountability:
Politics, Flood Damage, and Climate, 2 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 157, 158 (2001).
FEMA’s Sep. 1, 1999 rule (44 C.F.R. § 206.48 - Factors considered when
evaluating a Governor's request for a major disaster declaration) only provides
criteria in determining the need for public and individual assistance. A
preliminary damage assessment (not mentioned in the Stafford Act), conducted
jointly by FEMA and the requesting state, is an important part of this
consideration. 44 C.F.R. § 206.33
34
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volcanic eruptions, landslides, snowstorms, and droughts.40 The
exclusion of erosion from the definition of disaster is noteworthy
since this slow-moving disaster plagues so many ANVs.41 Erosion
is addressed through the national disaster regime only if it is sudden,
such as when a storm occurs.42
The exclusion of food-related disasters is also significant since
these disasters can impact subsistence. 43 Many ANVs depend on
subsistence practices for their nutritional and cultural needs.44 Given
the high costs of flying commercial foods into remote villages that
are off the road system, subsistence helps ensure food security.45 In

40

42 U.S.C. § 5122.
GAO, supra note 30; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ALASKA BASELINE
EROSION ASSESSMENT, STUDY FINDINGS AND TECHNICAL REPORT (2009).
42
My search of national disaster declarations from the 1950s to 2014 revealed
three instances mentioning erosion, including DR 1445 for “Severe Winter
Storms, Flooding, and Coastal Erosion and Tidal Surge” in Alaska’s Aleutian
Islands in 2012.
43
I use the State of Alaska’s legal definition for subsistence:
the noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of wild,
renewable resources by a resident domiciled in a rural area of
the state for direct personal of family consumption as food,
shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for the making
and selling of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products
of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family
consumption, and for the customary trade, barter, or sharing
for personal or family consumption.
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.940. This definition does not convey the significance of
subsistence to many Alaska Natives, who value it as a fundamental part of their
culture. E. Barrett Ristroph, Alaska Tribes’ Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ J
ENVTL POL 49 (2010).
44
Philip A. Loring et al., Ways to Help and Ways to Hinder: Governance for
Effective Adaptation to an Uncertain Climate, 64 ARCTIC 73 (2011); Patricia
Cochran, et al., Indigenous Frameworks for Observing and Responding to
Climate Change in Alaska, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 557 (2013).
45
Cochran, et al., supra note 44, at 560; Davin Holen, Fishing for Community
and Culture: The Value of Fisheries in Rural Alaska, 50 NORTHERN FISHERIES
403 (2014); McNeeley, supra note 7. By “food security,” I mean “a situation
that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life.” See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN
THE WORLD 2002 (2002), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7352e/y7352e00.htm
(https://perma.cc/VX5L-HDMH); Rachel Engler-Stringer, Food Security,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELL-BEING RESEARCH, 2326–27
(Alex C. Michalos ed., 2014). In the context of ANVs, “preference” is
particularly important since Western foods may be culturally unacceptable. See
Mark Nuttall et al., Hunting, Herding, Fishing and Gathering: Indigenous
Peoples and Renewable Resource Use in the Arctic, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 654, 649-690 (2005). Also important is the “active and healthy
41
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addition, subsistence enables families to spend time together and
pass down knowledge and values.46 There is no law providing
specifically for the kind of disaster that occurs when ANV residents
are not able to conduct their annual harvest of an important
subsistence species. Federal47 and state48 laws do allow for
"economic disasters" to be declared through the federal and state
commerce departments,49 but these do not necessarily cover
subsistence.
As I noted above, a Presidential Disaster Declaration is
important because of the relief that comes with it—funding, agency
support, and even relocation.50 Once a national disaster is declared,
FEMA utilizes the incident command system to coordinate the
response with other agencies (and in some cases, the military). It
provides public assistance51 to support government and nongovernment entities and individual assistance for housing and other
expenses.52 Payouts for disasters can be substantial. Congress
provided roughly $120 billion for Hurricane Katrina and $60 billion
for Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts.53 Nearly $6.9 million in

life” component, since subsistence supports an active and healthy lifeway Aaron
Wernham, Inupiat Health and Proposed Alaskan Oil Development: Results of
the First Integrated Health Impact Assessment/Environmental Impact Statement
for Proposed Oil Development on Alaska’s North Slope, 4 ECOHEALTH 514
(2007).
46
Michael Hibbard & Robert Adkins, Culture and Economy: The Cruel Choice
Revisited, RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS PLANNING, 94-112 (Ryan Walker,
Theodore S Jojola, & David C. Natcher eds., 2013); Jonathan M. Hanna, Native
Communities and Climate Change: Protecting Tribal Resources as Part of
National Climate Policy: Report, 11 (2007),
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=book
s_reports_studies (https://perma.cc/ACF4-NAB8); Nuttall et al., supra note 45,
at 654; Holen, supra note 45.
47
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265
(1996), §§ 312, 315, codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1861a, 1864;
Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act, Title III of Public Law 99–659 100 Stat.
3731(1986).
48
Alaska Stat. §§ 44.33.285, 44.33.310.
49
National disasters have been declared due to poor fisheries, typically related to
hurricanes, floods, changes in ocean conditions, or algal blooms. HAROLD F.
UPTON, COMMERCIAL FISHERY DISASTER ASSISTANCE, 6 (2011).
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individual assistance was provided after an Interior Alaska riverine
flooding disaster in 2009.54 While it is not clear whether postdisaster funding is sufficient to revive pre-disaster economies, 55 this
source of funding could be significant for a small, rural, and remote
ANV with a limited basis for generating revenue.56 It is especially
important for communities hoping to relocate; post-disaster
assistance enabled the community relocations of Alatna and Eagle
Village.
In the absence of a Presidential Disaster Declaration, a
community may still get assistance from the State of Alaska, though
the amount is likely to be much smaller.57 Unless the state legislature
approves a higher amount, the governor can provide up to $500,000
to avoid an impending disaster or $1 million to respond to a state
disaster declaration.58
A great deal of research has noted the lack of any correlation
between the issuance of disaster declarations and the amount of
damage incurred by disaster-struck communities, which suggests
that the issuance of disaster declarations relates more to politics than
it does to the vulnerability of communities.59 This may lead to unjust
consequences for ANVs that often lack political connections.

54
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B. Efforts to Address Disasters Before They Happen
In the previous section, I talked about the billions of dollars that
are spent attempting to restore disaster-stricken communities. In this
section, I will talk about the far smaller amount of money spent in
the arena of “hazard mitigation,” which seeks to reduce the risk of
disasters related to climate change as well as other natural hazards.
There is a lack of proactive spending despite a general agreement by
experts that money spent on hazard mitigation yields benefits that
well exceed the costs.60
FEMA has several hazard mitigation programs that provide for
disaster mitigation, preparation, and recovery, including the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the Pre-Disaster Mitigation
Program (PDM), and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA).61 FEMA
allows a state or tribe that has received a disaster declaration in the
last year to apply for HMGP funding, which the recipient can regrant to localities (or tribes that choose to be “sub-applicants”) to
reduce their hazard risks.62 Rather than providing states with a set,
consistent amount of funding, HMGP funds are calculated as a
percentage of payouts made through the last disaster declaration.63
FEMA’s PDM64 provides for projects similar to those covered
by HMGP. For PDM, there need not have been a disaster
declaration, and the amount of funding available is far less
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Emergency Management Agency Hazard Mitigation Grants, 14 MITIGATION
AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 655 (Oct. 2009); Tim G.
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APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 52 (June 2013).
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(whatever Congress chooses to allocate to the program that year).65
The third program, FEMA’s FMA provides funds to states,
territories, tribes, and local governments to prepare flood mitigation
plans and carry out mitigation projects. FMA requires communities
to participate in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).66
ANVs face several challenges to getting funding through the
programs mentioned above. First, to obtain funding to carry out
projects through HMGP or PDM, the ANV needs to have an existing
hazard mitigation plan.67 The creation of this plan is highly complex,
and most ANVs that were able to produce these plans hired
consultants to write them. Second, few, if any, ANVs are eligible
for FMA because they are not eligible for NFIP. This relates to the
fact that ANV tribal governments lack the jurisdiction over land that
they must have in order to establish the flooding ordinances that are
required for participation in NFIP.68
Third, measures for which FEMA provides funding must be
“cost-effective” or in the interest of NFIP.69 The challenge is that
some benefits are not easily quantified (i.e., cultural values, mental
health, and ecosystem services), and FEMA has a limited tolerance
for unconventional calculation methods.70 This, along with the
expenses associated with projects in remote ANVs, 71 impairs the
ability of ANVs to get funding for measures that can benefit their
communities and lifeways. Elizabeth Marino, an expert on disaster
relief funding, points out the injustice of FEMA’s cost-effective
standards for housing buyouts, noting that they focus on the value
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of the property rather than the protection of displaced peoples.72
Properties that have a lower market value (even if they would be
very expensive to rebuild in remote ANVs) may be less able to
garner buyouts.73
The Disaster Reform Act of 2018 did little to improve the predisaster funding situation for ANVs.74 For example, Section 1234 of
that Act amends 42 U.S.C. § 5133(f) to clarify that PDM awards
must be cost-effective.75 Although this is already a FEMA
requirement, it may increase the burden on remote ANVs that try to
get their projects funded. Further, Section 1234 narrows eligibility
for PDM in a manner similar to HMGP, so only state or tribes that
have had disaster declarations in the last seven years can get PDM.
76
This could reduce the incentive for states to prepare for climate
change related disasters. Finally, Section 1234 allows FEMA to set
aside from the Disaster Relief Fund (to which Congress chooses to
add money after disasters) funds used on various post-disaster
programs. 77 This money can go to technical and financial assistance
under PDM. This may be helpful in the sense that it makes more
funding available for grants, given that PDM is currently quite small
compared to HMGP. Yet it carries forward the arbitrary notion of
tying together hazard mitigation funding with how much was spent
on a disaster declaration—a declaration which may or may not relate
to a community’s vulnerability to disaster.
Obstacles to getting FEMA assistance are noteworthy
because FEMA plays the primary role in disaster response and
preparedness in the United States. Still, other agencies with
infrastructure-planning responsibilities do have roles in reducing
disaster risk. Among the most important is the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which provides flexible
funding to communities and tribes for infrastructure through the
Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) and the
Indian Development Grant Program. Funding specific to disaster
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relief is available through the CDBG Disaster Recovery program,
which extends recovery funding beyond what FEMA provides.78
But this assistance is available only after a national disaster
declaration, only to urban municipalities, and only such a quantity
as Congress decides to provide in a post-disaster appropriation act.79
C. Previous Research Relevant to Disasters Affecting ANVs
Other than articles calling for government assistance with
community relocation, there is little literature specific to climaterelated disasters in Alaska.80 Various authors have, however,
written about the physical and sociological impacts of and responses
to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill.81 While they may not help a
community navigate the legal and funding systems for getting
natural disaster assistance, lessons from this oil spill could be
instructive in terms of resilience to climate change and impacts to
subsistence resources.
One point that emerges from the articles written in response
to the Exxon-Valdez spill is that Alaska Natives may have different
processes than non-Natives for understanding, coping with, and
responding to disasters.82 There is a need for responses that address
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the particular concerns of Alaska Natives that both relate to their
subsistence lifeways and cultural practices and contribute to
healing.83 At worst, disaster responses that invalidate tribal concerns
and fail to acknowledge tribal sovereignty can contribute to what
some scholars see as the ongoing “permanent disaster” of
colonization.84
In sum, there is a robust top-down framework at the national
level for responding to fast-moving natural disasters. There are
substantially fewer resources available to help communities prepare
for and prevent disasters. This is particularly problematic for slowmoving disasters in Alaska related to climate change—specifically
permafrost melt and erosion. It is also problematic for communities
like ANVs that face challenges related to their eligibility for and
access to resources needed for disaster management. While much
research has been conducted on the need for assistance to ANVs
facing climate change-related disasters, there is a lack of research
on how the national disaster declaration system has affected ANVs
who have received disaster assistance. Likewise, outside of the
national framework there is a lack of research on how ANVs might
better prepare for disasters on their own.
III. KEY FINDINGS
A. Overview of Disaster Declarations in Alaska
State disaster declaration records provide some insight on
the nature of climate-related85 disasters in Alaska. Between 1977
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and 2019, there were 155 communities86 with state disaster
declarations and 220 state disaster declarations in total.87 The
Governor of Alaska requested a Presidential Disaster Declaration
for approximately eighteen of these disasters; the request was denied
on eight occasions and granted on ten other occasions. 88
There were thirty-seven sea storms, surges, and flooding
disasters (17% of all disasters); twelve rain and flooding disasters
(5% of all disasters); eighty-seven ice jams and flooding disasters
(40% of all disasters); ten erosion and flooding disasters (5% of all
disasters); twenty-four storms and flooding disasters (11% of all
disasters); and fifty other flooding disasters (23% of all disasters).89
Although some ANVs that are vulnerable to flooding and
erosion have been able to obtain disaster relief and even to relocate,
many have not. For example, the Native Village of Alaknuk
obtained eight state and five national disaster declarations (and
associated funding) related to flooding between 1977 and 2014.90
But Shishmaref, often cited as one of the villages that is most
vulnerable to climate change-related flooding and erosion,91
received only one state disaster declaration during this same period.
Thus, there may be inconsistencies between ANVs that are most
vulnerable to climate change and flooding and those that are
receiving disaster assistance.
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B. Challenges for ANVs in Preparing for and Responding to
Disasters
1. Limited Preparation at the Local Level
At a local level, many ANVs seem ready to face short-term
emergencies but have limited infrastructure to do so and little
experience related to what happens once a serious, fast-moving
disaster strikes. While many community plans mention past
disasters92 and have strategies relevant to emergencies,93 I did not
find any stand-alone disaster prevention and response plans similar
to what exists for some larger communities in the continental United
States.94 Instead, a number of participants referred to Small
Community Emergency Response Plans. These are short, easily
accessible flipbooks based on a state-designed template that provide
information on emergency contacts, places in the community where
residents can take shelter, and ways to evacuate. They can provide
guidance in the event of a disaster but do not look beyond the initial
disaster to the recovery period.
There may be a disconnect between the emergency
preparation measures mentioned in community plans and what ANV
residents are actually prepared to do. For example, local hazard
mitigation plans for thirty-three ANVs and four other plans listed
specific emergency preparedness measures such as emergency
drills, evacuation alerts, and storm warnings, but none of my
participants gave any indication that these measures were being
implemented. Further, a number of plans and ANV community
members proposed an evacuation road, which may not be feasible.
As participants outside ANVs pointed out, the funds for a road and
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the availability of gravel for its construction be challenging to
obtain, and the construction would require more gravel as the road
would need to be significantly elevated to avoid storm surge. A few
participants suggested that a gravel mound within the village would
be a more cost-effective way to protect from storm surge, given that
much less gravel would be required for a mound than for a road.
But, as of yet, ANVs facing storm surges have not been able to
construct a gravel mound, much less an evacuation road.
2. Limited Support at the National Level
My interviews also revealed a sense of frustration on account
of state and national funding for disaster prevention being relatively
limited in comparison to response funding and the fact that relatively
little is being done to address slow-moving disasters such as erosion
and permafrost melt. Several participants recommended amending
the Stafford Act to include erosion and climate change in the
definition of disaster. Yet many were pessimistic about prospects for
change. One ANV participant said, “It kind of feels like we don’t
really know how to move forward other than just acknowledging
that we need to prepare.”95 A few participants expressed the view
that it would take a disaster that affected middle-class Americans to
get more substantial funding to address climate-related disasters. As
one ANV participant said:
“Since 1954, we’ve lost over a quarter of a mile [of
land]. This year we’re going to lose our water
supply. We already lost our dump. . . . When a
hurricane comes to Florida, they immediately issue
a disaster declaration. But this one has been waiting
for ten years, fifteen years. We know it’s happening.
We lose about seventy-five feet a year.”96
Some participants from the federal government believed an
amendment to the Stafford Act that would allow related funding to
be utilized in combatting erosion was not likely to be made, for they
believe that Congress is unwilling to allocate the money that would

95

Telephone Interview with Participant No. 35, female tribal employee from
west coast of Alaska (Oct. 11, 2016).
96
Telephone Interview with Participant No. 12, male tribal employee from west
coast of Alaska (Feb. 24, 2017).

	
  
116

be needed to address all the resultant disaster declarations that would
be made by ANVs and similarly situated communities. One FEMA
employee explained that the Stafford Act is simply not designed to
address climate change.97
Views on barriers to disaster prevention parallel views on
barriers to address climate change more generally: Many
participants referred to a lack of political willingness to address
climate change and a tendency to be reactive rather than proactive.
A former member of the Alaska legislature said, “We don’t plan
enough and then we react badly.”98 A Native non-profit entity leader
said, “There’s a system, and the problem is [that] unless it’s broken,
it doesn’t get done.”99 A supporter of an ANV seeking to relocate
said, “If you knew that a village was going to be destroyed, what
would you do? Go to international conferences, write papers, and
get PhDs? The reality is that nobody . . . is spending any money to
assist climate endangered indigenous communities. . . . There are
villages being destroyed today.”100
3. Little Local Control when Disaster Strikes
a. An Unclear and Inefficient Process
Other than participants who had sought or received national
disaster declarations, few were familiar with the process.
Participants who had been through national disaster declarations
emphasized how important it is for ANVs to understand the disaster
management process so that a community can articulate its needs to
FEMA. The flooding disaster in Interior Alaska in 1994 illustrates
the importance of understanding the post-disaster process. A
participant who worked with ANVs following the flood described
how the Village of Alatna, which is located in a boreal forest in the
middle of Arctic Alaska, was able to use the process to relocate its
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small community to higher ground.101 Alatna had simple, clear
demands—residents wanted decent log cabins on a nearby hill out
of the floodplain.102 Alatna was able to negotiate a timeframe of one
year for rebuilding the community rather than the normal timeframe
of three years.103 Alatna chose to forego emergency funding for
temporary housing structures in the village to increase its investment
in long-term housing solutions.104 More than one participant
suggested that the Village of Allakaket (located across the river from
Alatna) did not have a clear plan, so its money was spent on more
peripheral needs like snow machines rather than permanent homes.
Residents opted for temporary houses to be built in the same
floodplain where many have remained for decades.105
A participant from another ANV described a lack of clarity
among community members/leadership regarding the community’s
options after a disaster, which made negotiations difficult: “Nobody
understood that if you don’t ask, you’re not going to get anything. .
. . If you say no to something you need, there’s no turning back, even
five minutes later. If you say ‘no’ once, that’s it. There’s still cleanup
that hasn’t happened because of that.”106
A few participants suggested that FEMA assistance was
inefficient or not very helpful to the community. One ANV resident
offered the following description of FEMA assistance:
“For the first three weeks, almost a month . . . they
had a Learjet that came in at 9:00 or 10:00 in the
morning and sat there all day. . . . They drove
around all day and took pictures of themselves and
the damage. . . . They flew in twenty-four ATVs,
top of the line, $30,000 each, so they could all ride
around town . . . then around four o’clock they jump
in the Learjet and they go back to wherever they
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come from. Come to find out, this ended up costing
about $11 million. . . . To this day, our water plant
is still flooding. It was never cleaned up.”107
The resident suggested that FEMA missed the opportunity to have
local residents participate in in disaster recovery by training local
residents to take photographs themselves.108
A FEMA representative offered a different view of the
recovery processes, noting that when a certain ANV flooded, FEMA
gave each household a choice of having FEMA entirely repair the
home or receive a grant to rebuild it themselves.109 The families that
took the home repair grant never completed their homes and left the
village, whereas the other families who had FEMA help are back in
the village. The representative suggested that this related to villages
not being fully immersed in a cash economy—when households got
handed a large chunk of money, they were not fully thinking through
the best uses of such funds.110
The disparate views of the recovery process between the ANV
residents and FEMA may relate to different ways of handling
disasters in different ANVs. They may also relate to different
perceptions of FEMA’s roles and responsibilities versus those of the
community and its individual residents.
b. Perception of Unfairness
Although it may be impossible to design a recovery process that
is completely fair to all ANV residents, it is important for FEMA to
aim for fairness. Problematically, a few participants from ANVs
who experienced disaster declarations said that FEMA funding was
unfairly distributed between similarly situated communities or
individuals within those communities. One participant said that
because he had not agreed to have FEMA buy out (and then destroy)
his flooded home, FEMA would not help him with anything else,
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even food. After refusing the buyout, he was not allowed to take any
emergency food supplies from FEMA.111
A participant from another ANV said that there was a disparity
between the way FEMA treated her as a tribal leader and the way
FEMA treated non-tribal municipal leaders during disaster
recovery.112 The tribal leader said that FEMA personnel threatened
her and pointed out multiple times that she would go to jail if she
lied and that they did not treat the city mayor the same way. Further,
there was confusion and conflict regarding FEMA’s purchase of
flooded houses. Some people got to keep their houses that got
flooded out, while others were told that if they took the purchase
money, they could not have any part of their old houses.113 It seemed
to the tribal leader that a disproportional number of non-Natives got
to keep their houses even though they received buyout money.114
Some of the conflict and confusion may relate to the legal residency
requirements for buyouts.115 These laws are not designed to address
the situation that a number of ANV citizens find themselves in: They
live in urban areas for employment or health reasons but consider
their house within an ANV to be their primary home. A participant
from the same ANV described his frustration over FEMAs refusal
to buyout the cabin of his mother, who lived in the ANV seven to
nine months of the year.116
c. Failure to Provide for Subsistence
A few participants noted that FEMA generally does not
provide funding for subsistence food or damage to subsistence

111

Telephone Interview with Participant No. 31, male tribal citizen from Interior
Alaska (Jan. 1, 2017).
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Interview with Participant No. 58, female tribal citizen from Interior Alaska,
in Fairbanks, Alaska (Feb. 28, 2017).
113
Under FEMA buyout programs, the purchased property is generally required
to be maintained as open space in perpetuity to restore and/or conserve the
natural floodplain functions. 42 U.S.C. §5170c(b)(2); 44 C.F.R. §80.11(f).
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Interview with Participant No. 58, female tribal citizen from Interior Alaska,
in Fairbanks, Alaska (Feb. 28, 2017).
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FEMA’s post-disaster individual assistance program, which pays to buy out
damaged homes, only applies to homes that serve as a primary residence. 42
U.S.C. § 5174(b)(1). Under 44 C.F.R. § 206.113(b)(2), those “who have
adequate rent-free housing accommodations” are ineligible for housing
assistance.
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Telephone Interview with Participant No. 57, male tribal citizen from Interior
Alaska (Jan. 15, 2015).
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equipment. In the words of the FEMA representative, “FEMA
doesn’t do food.”117 One participant from an ANV showed me
photos of a subsistence camp destroyed by ice during a storm and
asked why FEMA did not give disaster funding to subsistence
infrastructure. Not only is subsistence economically important for
ANV residents, he said, it is important to preserving the culture:
“Fish in the freezer is like money in the bank. Fish camp is a vehicle
to provide food. Subsistence is a job.”118
To summarize, when representatives of the national
government enter into an ANV and employ a top-down command
system to respond to disasters, it is effective in providing immediate
relief in terms of physical needs. But it can seem unfair,
inconsiderate, and even colonizing to local residents who do not
understand the process and do not feel fully involved in the
recovery.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While some ANV participants and plans have called for
more robust measures to prepare for and prevent disasters, funding
for large-scale infrastructure and relocation generally comes only
after a disaster declaration. ANVs have relatively few means for
responding to disasters other than basic emergency plans and
supplies that meet needs during and immediately after disasters.
Aside from Newtok Village, which is engaged in a gradual
relocation to Mertarvik, there is a lack of formal planning at the
community, state, and national levels regarding what ANV residents
will do and where they will go when a disaster strikes, and homes
become uninhabitable. In recent times, this lack of consideration has
resulted in hasty, top-down post-disaster management that has left
some ANV residents feeling unfairly treated. In this section, I
discuss some measures that might improve pre- and post-disaster
management.
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Telephone Interview with Participant No. 152, female FEMA employee from
Anchorage, Alaska (Jul. 8, 2016).
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Interview with Participant No. 23, male tribal citizen from the west coast of
Alaska, in Nome, Alaska (Jan. 23, 2017).
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A. Potential for Amending the Stafford Act
Among my participants, there have been calls to amend the
Stafford Act119 so that it is more proactive and inclusive of slowmoving disasters, such as gradual erosion and permafrost melt.
Hazards related to climate change that are currently excluded from
the definition of “disaster” (i.e., “erosion” and “permafrost melt”)
could be added. A similar change could be made to the state’s
disaster declaration process, which mirrors the federal process.120
However, such an amendment, without any further action on
the part of Congress or FEMA, does not guarantee that badly
eroding ANVs would get disaster assistance. The literature has
demonstrated that disaster declarations can be politically motivated,
such that those with better political connections and understanding
of the system would be in a better position to get disaster
declarations than impoverished ANVs.121 To address this, FEMA
has sufficient discretion under the Stafford Act122 to issue additional
criteria for who is eligible to receive disaster declarations similar to
how it has issued criteria for determining the need for public and
individual assistance.123 There could be some sort of sliding scale
based on monetary damage thresholds (i.e., how much damage there
must be to rise to the level of a disaster) based on median incomes
in the affected regions. Declarations based solely on such a sliding
scale could negatively affect communities with below-average per
capita incomes in relatively wealthy states that choose not to spend
their own money.124 To avoid this impact, there could be an
exception for declarations involving communities below a certain
income threshold. There could also be other “vulnerability” factors
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42 U.S.C. § 5122.
The state legislature could amend the Alaska Disaster Act to specifically
include erosion and permafrost in the disaster declaration definition and to more
clearly delineate thresholds for when damage rises to the level of a disaster.
Alaska Stat. §§ 26.23.020, 26.23.900(2). Flooding, storms, and other climatechange related disasters are already part of the definition of disaster under both
state and national law.
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Supra note 59.
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42 U.S.C. § 5170(a).
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44 C.F.R. § 206.48.
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The Stafford Act in its current form actually prohibits such an effect: “No
geographic area shall be precluded from receiving assistance under this Act
solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding scale based on income or
population.” 42 U.S.C. § 5163.
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assessed aside from just income, such as whether the disaster affects
minority communities or those dependent on subsistence foods.125
While criteria that limit disaster declarations and financial assistance
to areas and communities that need it most would reduce the
flexibility of FEMA and the President to declare a disaster, they
would increase the likelihood of assistance being directed to where
it is most needed.
Changes to the Stafford Act should address the
disproportionate amount of post-disaster funding compared to predisaster funding. Part of the problem is that the Stafford Act makes
preventative funding under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(HMGP) equal to a small percentage of money spent on recent
disaster declarations, rather than basing spending on the risk of
future disasters.126 This means that a community that did not get a
presidential disaster declaration cannot get HMGP funding,
although it could still apply for the smaller pot of funding available
through the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM). Hazard
mitigation plans, which are specifically required to assess and
quantify future risks and damages,127 could serve as a better basis
for determining the amount of mitigation funding to which a
jurisdiction is entitled. If a community does not have a hazard
mitigation plan, its risks could be approximated from those of a
nearby community and/or the state hazard mitigation plan.
With regards to FEMA’s cost-benefit rules for HMGP and
PDM, just as American individuals pay progressively higher levels
of income tax on greater earnings, FEMA could require households
and communities with higher levels of income to demonstrate a
higher benefit to cost ratio for proposed projects.128 Communities
recognized as “small and impoverished”129 by FEMA could be
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National agencies are already required to consider environmental justice
concerns in their decision-making. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. § 7629
(1994).
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42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a) (2018); 44 C.F.R. § 206.432 (2009).
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44 C.F.R. §§ 201.4–.7 (2015).
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Both statutes, like 42 U.S.C. § 5133(h) (2018) and 44 C.F.R. § 206.434
(2016), and guidance, like FEMA, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE UNIFIED GUIDANCE: HAZARD MITIGATION
GRANT PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD
MITIGATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM at 40 (2013), could be revised to
incorporate the recommended progressive cost-benefit calculation requirement.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 5133(a) (2018).
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approved for projects with a lower benefit-cost ratio. This would
be consistent with climate justice, given that many impoverished
communities, particularly indigenous communities, have not had a
large historical role in contributing to greenhouse gases but lack
the means to address climate change impacts.130
B. Smoothing the Response and Recovery Process
There may be additional things that FEMA could do to
smooth the disaster declaration and recovery process, such as more
consistent adherence to existing FEMA regulations on how money
is to be spent in disaster recovery.131 FEMA could issue regulations
expressing a preference for more permanent, climate-appropriate
housing for residents with a demonstrated interest in staying in the
village, as opposed to the kind of temporary housing in the
floodplain that Allakaket received. Cash buyouts under HMGP may
be more appropriate for those who do not want to be in the village.
Further, FEMA should consider what functions could be performed
by residents, rather than flying FEMA workers to and from the
disaster site each day. FEMA could develop a video or video series
that could be watched on a smartphone or on DVD to explain how
the disaster declaration/recovery process works (i.e., options in
terms of moving buildings or rebuilding, typical timeframes). The
video could feature residents who went through process (i.e.,
Allakaket and Alatna) talking about and comparing their
experiences.
To avoid “colonizing” disaster response, there is a need to
better integrate subsistence and other Alaska Native lifeway
concerns into the natural disaster recovery process. The Stafford Act
already allows FEMA to provide for various personal and workrelated needs for individuals.132 For example, FEMA’s Other Needs
Assistance (ONA) program specifies some of these needs133 but
does not mention subsistence. It could be interpreted or specifically
amended to provide for subsistence-related infrastructure (i.e., fish
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wheels, cabins where subsistence participants temporarily reside)
and gear (i.e., nets, boats).134
Another way to address subsistence would be for Congress
to amend the Magnuson Stevens Act and/or the Interjurisdictional
Fisheries Act135 to add “subsistence” to the section providing for
disaster relief. This would allow the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) to declare and provide relief for
disasters that specifically affect subsistence.136 Alaska’s separate
law on economic disasters, which has been used for subsistence,
could be revised to better address subsistence disasters and provide
relief to the extent that FEMA fails to address subsistence after
presidential disaster declarations.
Short of changing laws, it would be helpful for those who
may be involved in disaster recovery in ANVs to have some sort of
cultural sensitivity training and understanding of ANV lifeways. To
start, various ANVs have already worked with national agencies to
create videos providing such training.137
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Some FEMA officials may already be interpreting ONA to provide for this.
There is a photo of a fish wheel in FEMA’s press coverage of the Eagle Village
recovery with the caption, “Salmon Wheels are a necessary tool for the
subsistence living residents in the upper Yukon and FEMA provides Other
Needs Assistance (ONA) in the form of grants to those who are eligible for
federal assistance.” ADAM DUBROWA, SALMON WHEEL IN RUIN (photo. reprint
(Aug, 7, 2013) (Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/images/72358 [https://perma.cc/AZT4-UH87].
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Pertinent sections of both are respectively codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1802
(2018), 16 U.S.C. § 1861a (2006), 16 U.S.C. § 1864 (2007).
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relocate subsistence hunters and their equipment to alternate hunting sites and to
safely return the hunters, their equipment and subsistence catch to their village;
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their designated destination; and assistance for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling
Commission to restore their International Whaling Commission subsistence
whaling quota. EXXONMOBIL & NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, POINT THOMSON
PROJECT OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY MITIGATION AGREEMENT (2009).
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U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Alaska Native Cross Cultural Communication
for Law Enforcement (May 19, 2016)
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C. Thinking beyond FEMA and the Stafford Act
Amending the Stafford Act was participants’ most common
suggestion for fixing the disaster framework. Based on participants’
descriptions of FEMA as taking an emergency, incident command
approach with limited community participation, however, perhaps
FEMA is not the best-equipped agency to be charged with long-term
efforts to avoid disasters. As one state planner told me, “FEMA
doesn’t have scientists and engineers, it is really just designed for
disaster response.”138
It could be more useful to allocate limited funding to
programs that are more flexible in meeting community needs and
have longer planning horizons, such as the Community Block
Development Grants administered by the national Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The legislation and
regulations authorizing these grants do not specifically provide for
hazard mitigation activities like elevation and relocation, but it is
possible that such activities might fall within the permissible
category of “rehabilitation.” 139 Otherwise, there may be a need to
broaden HUD’s mandate so that it can better assist communities
seeking to protect themselves or relocate in the face of climate
change-related disasters.
D. ANV Mobilization
ANVs have faced emergencies and disasters for millennia
and have a history of sharing resources and being prepared to endure
temporary discomfort. In modern times, this resilience is evidenced
by descriptions of emergency preparedness measures, such as
providing for generators, extra supplies, and family emergency
kits.140 But emergency preparedness alone will not enable ANVs to
rebuild after major disasters with the kind of infrastructure to which
they have become accustomed in modern times.
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Telephonic Interview with Participant No. 94, female Alaska state employee
(Jul. 28, 2016).
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energy efficiency).” FEMA could adjust 24 C.F.R. § 570.202 (2017) (Eligible
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It would be valuable for ANV residents to agree on what,
where, and how each village wants to rebuild in the event of a
disaster that destroys much of their existing infrastructure. This need
not be some glossy Disaster Recovery Plan prepared by an outside
consultant. It could be a joint resolution providing a vision for postdisaster rebuilding passed by the Tribal Council, the council of the
incorporated city associated with the ANV, if any, and other
leadership entities in the community. For example, the resolution
could indicate that new homes will be built in a certain elevated area
nearby the community. An ANV could also set a priority on who is
most eligible for new housing (i.e., year-round residents, followed
by elders and families with children). Finally, given the lack of
attention to subsistence and other lifeway concerns at the national
level, ANVs could consider how they will meet their nutritional and
cultural needs in the event that disaster reduces the population of, or
access to, an important subsistence resource. This may involve
informal or formal agreements with other ANVs whose subsistence
may not be affected. Being proactive could avoid a hasty, unplanned
disaster response from FEMA that gives rise to a sense of
colonization and injustice.
Developing a post-disaster vision and mustering the
resources to carry it out is easier said than done. From a Western
standpoint, there is a significant gap in “capacity” between those
who live in ANVs and those outside ANVs involved in disaster
response.141 It is important for ANV leaders to improve their
understanding of state and national resources and processes relevant
to disaster management. As a start, ANVs can take advantage of free
disaster management courses offered regularly at FEMA’s training
institute.142 It is also important for ANVs to build relationships with
staff at FEMA and the equivalent state agency, as well as other
agencies that can provide resources.
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States and, to a lesser extent, the state of Alaska have
a system in place to provide funding to Alaska Native Villages and
other communities struck by major flooding events. However, this
system does little to address the slow-moving erosion and
permafrost melt in Alaska, and it can seem unfair, inconsiderate, and
even colonizing to local residents who do not understand the process
and do not feel fully involved in the recovery. Not only is there a
need for more proactive efforts to address disasters related to climate
change, but there is also a need for better understanding and action
at two levels. First, at higher levels, there is a need to understand the
particular concerns of ANVs in terms of their subsistence lifeway
and the logistical difficulties in obtaining infrastructure and external
support. Federal laws, or at least agency practices, may need to be
adjusted to better provide for subsistence concerns in the event of a
disaster and to level the playing field for ANVs that want to access
assistance outside of a disaster through FEMA’s hazard mitigation
programs or other programs. Taking into account the particular
needs and values of ANVs may help reduce the extent to which
assistance comes across as colonizing and unjust. Second, there is a
need for ANVs to plan beyond an initial disaster so that they are
prepared to fully engage in the recovery process and avoid
rebuilding in a manner that does not serve community needs and
values. ANVs should be able to act on the sovereignty that they have
to make decisions about their future. Doing so will require building
the capacity to make decisions within the Western framework in
which these communities find themselves and access the resources
needed to carry out these decisions.
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